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The adoption of management control systems (MCS) is a key element in managing the tension that growth imposes
on young growing firms. Despite its importance to a large number of organizations, only recently has the empirical
literature devoted attention to the evolution of these systems over the lifecycle of firms [Moores and Yuen, Account.
Organizat. Soc. 26 (2001) 351]. This paper builds upon existing management control theory, mostly focused on
established organizations, and existing predictions based on extended field observations to explore how these systems
are adopted within growing firms. To advance theory, the paper also draws from the entrepreneurship and life cycle
literatures. It identifies several variables as drivers of the emergence of management control systems including the size of
the organization, its age, the replacement of the founder as CEO, and the existence of outside investors. The empirical
evidence, from a database on the adoption of human resource management systems, is consistent with these variables
being associated with the adoption of MCS. The paper also provides initial results on how the emergence of various
types of management control systems depends on which systems the organization has already adopted.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1
Introduction
Existing research taking an organizational view
of management control systems (MCS) focuses
mostly on the population of medium and large
firms where formal systems have long been estab-
lished and play a major role in structuring the
organization and implementing strategy (Lang-
field-Smith, 1997; Luft & Shields, 2003). More-* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-650-724-50-60; fax: +1-650-
725-04-68.
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doi:10.1016/j.aos.2004.05.006over, the typical research design approaches the
study of MCS from a cross-sectional perspective
rather than taking a longitudinal view. 1 Over
time, this literature has developed a rich set of
variables to explain the cross-sectional variation
among different types of MCS as well as amongPapers that have taken a longitudinal design include Jones
(1985) and Kober, Ng, and Paul (2000) who use field research to
study the redesign of management control systems in processes
of organizational change. Also a different line of research has
examined causality in management control systems through
experiment-based research designs (Fisher, Maines, Peffer, &
Sprinkle, 2002; Webb, 2002).
d.
3 An important line of research studies the relevance of
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2000; Shields & Shields, 1998). The theoretical
underpinning, rooted in contingency (Chapman,
1997; Chenhall, 2003) and agency theories (Bai-
man, 1982) has emphasized a static, cross-sectional
view of organizations.
However, an important transition point in the
life of organizations that is receiving increasing
attention is the emergence ofMCS (Sandino, 2004).
Lack of professional management tools such as
MCS has been argued to restrain growth and even
to cause the failure of firms (Greiner, 1972, 1998).
MCS are important to organizational growth
(Flamholtz & Randle, 2000); they liberate top
managers’ attention from processes that can be
controlled by exception and provide them with
information when their informal network is over-
loaded. Thus, understanding how this transition
happens is an important research and managerial
question. This transition point, when companies
move from an informal management approach to
the need for formal management tools, is most
visible in the population of small growing firms. 2
Growing companies are faced quickly with the
tensions associated with informal processes and the
challenge of successfully mastering the transition
into formal control systems. At this point, the dy-
namic process of transitioning from an informal
management to the development of MCS becomes
critical to the success of these organizations. So far,
our understanding of how these systems emerge in
growing firms is captured through experience-
based models (Flamholtz & Randle, 2000; Greiner,
1972, 1998; Simons, 2000). Based on life cycle
models (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989; Miller & Frie-
sen, 1984) of the firm, recent research (Moores &
Yuen, 2001) empirically identifies the growth phase
in the life cycle of an organization as the phase
when MCS become important to management.
The objective of this paper is to extend current
theory and examine empirically variables that are
predicted to be associated with the emergence of2 The phenomenon, which is driven by small organizations
outgrowing informal management processes, may also be
observed within departments of medium and large firms.MCS. 3 This exploratory study focuses on those
systems associated with human resource manage-
ment in high-technology firms. Managing human
resources is likely to be one of the most challenging
tasks that small growing firms face and whereMCS
may have an earlier role. While not exhaustive of
all management control systems in an organization
(therefore, the results cannot be generalized to any
MCS), systems that are used to manage organiza-
tional culture, evaluate and reward employees, and
code organizational processes capture a significant
and important part of MCS in small growing firms.
Moreover, focusing on a subset of MCS allows
triangulating the data among different respondents
knowledgeable of these systems, in particular
CEOs and people knowledgeable about human
resource practices. This triangulation has the
objective of increasing the reliability of the data at
the expense of reducing the scope of MCS that
could have been examined, given the knowledge of
the managers interviewed. Because firms typically
face similar challenges in managing human re-
sources, focusing on these systems allows cross-
sectional comparability. While focusing on a subset
of MCS limits extrapolation of the results beyond
theoretical generalizability (Yin, 1989), previous
work has taken this approach given of the benefits
associated with it (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Ger-
din, forthcoming).
Because the study relies on the experience of
respondents regarding the adoption of MCS, the
sample criteria include achieving a certain size over
a relatively short period of time. Moreover, given
the field nature of the research project a geo-
graphical criterion was also imposed. Most of the
firms that meet these three criteria are in the high-
technology industry, an industry that because of
the dynamism associated with it has been an
important research field (Burgelman, 2002), andentrepreneurial strategies (also prospector strategies) to the
design of management control systems (Simons, 1987). This
type of research is typically cross-sectional and focuses on
entrepreneurial strategies as part of a typology of business
strategies not necessarily associated with small, young firms.
These studies do not examine the emergence of MCS, which is
the focus of this paper.
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control for potential omitted variables at the ex-
pense of limited generalizability of results (Yin,
1989).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The second section develops the theory behind this
exploratory study. Predictions are grounded on
existing knowledge in the management control
systems and entrepreneurship literatures and
variables that existing models of the emergence of
MCS have identified (Flamholtz & Randle, 2000;
Greiner, 1972, 1998; Simons, 2000). The third
section presents the research design. The study is
based on a rich database (Baron, Burton, &
Hannan, 1996, 1999) that includes survey as well
as interview information on the human resource
practices of a large sample of young, high-tech-
nology firms. The fourth section presents the re-
sults. The results indicate that both size and age
affect the emergence of MCS for human resource
management. However, the impact of age de-
creases with firm size. The evidence is also con-
sistent with the presence of venture capital and the
replacement of the founder by a new CEO affect-
ing the emergence of these systems. Further evi-
dence indicates that the replacement of the
founder is mostly significant for smaller firms.
Finally, the paper provides evidence on how
existing control systems affect the adoption of new
ones, and which particular systems are adopted
earlier. The fifth section suggests future research
and concludes.4 The variables identified in this section are structural
variables in that they reflect changes in the firm environment.
Another set of variables that have been suggested to drive the
emergence of MCS is event variables. For example, Simons
states that MCS may be adopted as reaction to ‘‘breakdowns in
control . . . Errors, bad decisions, missed opportunities’’ (p.
309). Organizational redesign may also be due to performance
crisis (Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986). The focus of
the study is the structural variables described; however, the role
of these events as drivers of MCS adoption is an open research
question. See also the discussion in the conclusions’ section for
a further elaboration on alternative variables.Theoretical framework
Various lines of research provide guidance to
inform explanations of the emergence of manage-
ment control systems including: experience-based
models (Flamholtz & Randle, 2000; Greiner, 1972,
1998; Simons, 2000), the entrepreneurship litera-
ture (Bhide, 1999; Covin & Slevin, 1997), and
contingency research in MCS (Bruns & Water-
house, 1975; Chenhall, 2003; Govindarajan, 1988;
Otley, 1980). The current study combines the
concepts and relationships outlined in these lines
of research in order to understand the emergence
of MCS, and empirically explores variables thatare predicted to affect this phenomenon. 4 In
bringing these different literatures together, the
paper explicitly develops new theoretical argu-
ments that are needed to explore a research ques-
tion in a field in its early phases, where evidence is
still emerging (Sandino, 2004).
The empirical study explores the association
between certain variables and the emergence of
MCS––a ‘‘selection’’ approach within the contin-
gency theory framework (Drazin & Van de Ven,
1985)––in an effort to explain why these systems
are adopted. It does not address how this associ-
ation affects the performance of the organiza-
tion––an interaction or ‘‘fit’’ approach. The
research design is based on a longitudinal database
of companies transitioning from the birth to the
growth stage (Miller & Friesen, 1984), where the
phenomenon is more likely to be of relevance.
Recent research supports this focus and indicates
that the emergence of MCS is most important for
organizations moving through their growth stage
(Moores & Yuen, 2001), when coordination and
control problems cannot be solved through infor-
mal interaction (as happens during the birth
stage). These authors conclude: ‘‘Growth firms . . .
pay particular attention to increasing the formality
of their management accounting systems’’ (p. 351).Conceptualization of management control
systems for human resource management
This study defines management control systems
as ‘‘the formal, information-based routines and
procedures managers use to maintain or alter
patterns in organizational activities’’ (Simons,
226 T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–2481994, p. 5). Theory offers several alternatives to
further classify these systems (Anthony, 1988;
Simons, 1994). For the purpose of this research,
the typology initially proposed by Thompson
(1967) and Ouchi (1979) and significantly refined
by Merchant (1985, 1998) is used. This typology
provides several advantages for this study. First, it
is not limited to large organizations and its rich-
ness can be exploited within small growing orga-
nizations. Second, it can be applied to a subset of
control systems and, in particular, to systems for
human resource management. 5 Finally, the defi-
nitions of the various control processes in this
typology are specific enough to map practices into
it. 6
The typology identifies three different control
mechanisms 7 labeled, according to the most re-
cent formulation by Merchant (1998), as: personnel
control––mechanisms that influence organizational
actors by aligning their personal objectives with
those of the organization; action control––mecha-
nisms that influence organizational actors by pre-
scribing the actions they should take; and results
control––mechanisms that influence organizational
actors by measuring the result of their actions.Drivers of the emergence of MCS––size
Size has been found to explain cross-sectional
variation among the design of MCS (Merchant,
1981), the survival of young firms (Hannan &
Freeman, 1989) and is the basis for organization
life cycle models (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989).
Within the experience-based models of emergence5 Previous research using this typology has successfully used
it to analyze the control process within specific functions rather
than at the company level (Rockness & Shields, 1988).
6 Sandino (2004) proposes a different typology of manage-
ment control systems in young firms based on whether their
objective is to inform about revenues, costs, or risks.
7 The word ‘‘mechanism’’ is used to reflect the fact that this
typology is not restricted to formal control systems and can also
include informal mechanisms. To make this distinction, ‘‘mech-
anism’’ includes both formal and informal procedures, while
‘‘systems’’ refer to formal mechanisms only.of MCS, size is proposed as a driver in all cases 8
(Flamholtz & Randle, 2000; Greiner, 1972, 1998;
Simons, 2000, p. 310). In the early stages of a
company, control and coordination happens
through frequent and informal interactions. As the
company grows, its attention shifts to developing
systems that anchor informal interactions around
a set of formalized systems. The relevance of size is
linked to the increasing costs of governance asso-
ciated with an informal approach to management.
Informal management requires direct contact
among employees; but as the number of people
increases, the number of possible interactions
among organizational members increases much
faster. 9 If these interactions drive coordination
and control costs, then the efficiency of an infor-
mal management rapidly decreases with size
(Bhide, 1999, Chap. 10). Because communication
and control happen through direct contact, orga-
nizational members need to allocate an increasing
amount of time to maintaining an increasing
number of interactions. This time is divested from
potentially more value-added activities. To regain
efficiency in managing the organization, coordi-
nation and control mechanisms are formalized
with the objective of coding and documenting
organizational learning (Ditillo, forthcoming; Le-
vitt & March, 1988) and reducing the demand that
routine activities impose on the management
team’s time. Size may also reflect increasing com-
plexity not only through the interaction among
participants and the need for differentiation and
integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), but also
through the complexity associated with new mar-
kets and new products (Mintzberg, 1979). These
arguments suggest a positive association between
size and the adoption of MCS.8 The arguments in these models are based on cause–effect
relationships, however the empirical tests in the current study
are tests of association and not causality and the results should
be interpreted with this caveat in mind. The paper refers to the
variables that these models predict as affecting the emergence of
MCS as ‘‘drivers.’’ The use of this term is related to the
evolutionary perspective and the causal association that these
models adopt. It should not be interpreted as suggesting that
the results of the paper prove causality.
9 For N employees the number of potential one-to-one
interactions is NðN  1Þ=2.
10 Age may not have a linear relationship with the emergence
of MCS (Luft & Shields, 2003). While age may initially be
associated with learning, as firms become older they may also
become set in their operating ways and unable to change. I
appreciate one of the reviewers for pointing out this potential
non-linearity.
T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248 227The previous arguments are valid for MCS
interpreted as homogenous systems. However,
Merchant’s framework allows more detailed argu-
ments regarding differential impact of size upon
management systems. To the extent that these
arguments are empirically confirmed, the assump-
tion of homogenous systems that underlies the
testing of MCS as a whole becomes less valid and
the empirical results at this level less informative.
In small firms, personnel control are imple-
mented informally. Frequent interactions allow
new employees to absorb the culture of the orga-
nization, acquire the knowledge required to execute
their job, and communicate their ideas to man-
agement. As the organization grows, the forces that
undermine informal management outlined in the
previous paragraphs lead to the formalization of
personnel control. Formal personnel control in-
sures that new employees receive proper introduc-
tion to the company’s culture (rather than relying
on processes that happen through informal inter-
actions) and current employees are periodically
reminded of organizational objectives. These sys-
tems are most salient in human resource manage-
ment systems that are important levers to manage
organizational culture. Thus, size is expected to be
associated with personnel control systems.
Size also drives the need to codify organizational
processes through action control systems; in par-
ticular, processes within the human resource func-
tion benefit from formalization because they clarify
expectations, facilitate coordination, and simplify
control through organizational rules and employee
roles. However, action control systems have also
been associated with internal controls (Merchant,
1998) that have argued to be the only formal con-
trols required from the start of a firm (Simons,
1994). If this is the case, then action control systems
are in place from the founding of the firm and
therefore their adoption unrelated to size.
Finally, size is also expected to affect the for-
malization of results control. Smaller firms rely on
the judgment of the founder to distribute rewards
(both social and economic); moreover, the moti-
vation of initial employees may be close to that of
the founder; however, as the organization grows,
the founder is less likely to be able to have enough
information to evaluate every employee, newemployees may put more weight on tangible re-
wards and systems are formalized to provide these
rewards. Thus, size is expected to be associated
with the formalization of results control.Drivers of the emergence of MCS––age
The second variable that has been argued to
drive the emergence of MCS is age (Greiner, 1972,
1998). Age has been found to be associated with
the likelihood of survival, where older firms are
more likely to survive than their younger coun-
terparts (liability of newness) (Hannan & Free-
man, 1989). Age acts through the learning that
accrues from experience in a way similar to the
mechanisms that govern the learning curve. Even
if the company is not growing, learning about
management can be translated into improved
MCS. Learning requires experience, experimenta-
tion, and interaction with other firms that can only
be acquired over time as processes are executed
again and again until a dominant design is chosen.
Management control systems then emerge to for-
malize this learning by codifying routines and
liberating management attention from repetitive
tasks. The process is similar to enactment, selec-
tion, and retention processes (Weick, 1979), where
organizations experiment with different alterna-
tives (variation), select one, and develop mecha-
nisms to retain the alternative chosen. If MCS
facilitate the process of management, age will be
related to their emergence. 10
Routines, as part of action control systems,
have traditionally been interpreted as repositories
of organizational learning (Howard-Grenville,
2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and the arguments
in the previous paragraph apply to action control.
Initially, organizational members experiment with
different ways of executing processes until a satis-
factory solution is found, which is then codified.
11 The argument does not suggest that all founders are
replaced or that the only reason for replacement is inadequate
personal characteristics to take the company to the next stage.
However, the literature suggests that the argument will hold on
average.
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action control.
Codification may also play a role in personnel
and results controls. Over time management may
experiment with different approaches to align the
motivation of employees and manage the culture
and with different ways of rewarding results. This
experimentation, following the learning arguments
developed in the previous paragraphs, then leads
to the formalization of these systems. However
and in contrast to the relevance of this learning-
codification argument to action control, personnel
and result controls do not necessarily formalize
learning as routines do. Rather they may be
interpreted as systems that are adopted to solve a
pressing challenge, such as loosing employees be-
cause the culture was not well communicated to
them or because they did not get the appropriate
economic incentives. If the emergence of these
systems is unrelated to learning and are adopted
because of reasons other than age, then we do not
expect age to be associated with them.
The previous two variables (age and size) may
interact to increase the probability of emergence of
MCS. In particular, the learning that accrues with
age may not be relevant to smaller companies
where informal communication and control may be
more effective than formal MCS. For these smaller
firms, the costs of formalization outweigh their
benefits. Even if the experience that these firms
have accumulated would facilitate the emergence of
MCS, their size does not require this step. Thus, the
arguments developed in the previous paragraphs
may depend on the size of the organization.
Drivers of the emergence of MCS––new CEO
In addition to size and age, the replacement of
the founder has been identified as a critical event in
moving from an informal organization to an
organization that formalizes its processes (Greiner,
1972, 1998). The argument is based on the psy-
chological characteristics of entrepreneurs being
unsuited to manage a more formalized organiza-
tion. Greiner (1998) indicates that ‘‘[the founders]
are probably temperamentally unsuited to be
managers’’ (p. 61). The need to replace founders
with professional managers is echoed in Flamholtzand Randle (2000) as well as in the entrepreneur-
ship literature (Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Willard,
Krueger, & Feeser, 1992). This literature suggests
that personal characteristics of most entrepreneurs
are well suited for the uncertain environment of a
young startup; but these same characteristics are
ill-suited to the management of a more structured
and larger organization (Mintzberg, 1973). 11
The limitations of the founder to move from an
entrepreneurial to a managerial role (Mintzberg,
1973) are likely to be more relevant for personnel
control. Because entrepreneurs have a vision of
where they want to lead to company and the ori-
ginal team shares this vision, they are more likely to
disregard the need tomanage themotivation of new
employees under the assumption that everybody
joins the company for its vision. Their leadership,
charisma or the promise of the business model takes
care of the culture of the organization and therefore
personnel control systems are not needed. Only
when a new CEO joins the company, the need for
these systems is realized and they are put in place.
In contrast, the need for action control emerges
because of the need to formalize learning or
organize business processes and therefore is more
likely to be unrelated to the management style of
the entrepreneur. Unless entrepreneurs are unable
to establish processes or allow their development,
action control systems are adopted because of
business needs and therefore unrelated to the
turnover in the CEO position.
The effect of CEO turnover on results control
depends on the balance of the arguments that have
been developed for personnel and action controls.
On the one hand, results control systems are
associated with motivation and as such the entre-
preneur may not give them appropriate weight
because of the arguments developed for personnel
control. On the other hand, the needs associated
with a growing business lead to result control
much in the same way as action control does; for
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demand clear accountability goals.
Much in the same way as size may interact with
age, the effect of CEO turnover may be more
important to management control systems in
smaller companies. Larger firms may already have
adopted the MCS that they need and the change in
CEO position is unrelated to the ability of this
person to grow the company. In contrast, smaller
firms lack MCS and the replacement of the CEO
may be more relevant to the emergence of MCS.
Moreover, this argument may not only hold for
personnel control but also for action control. In
particular, smaller firms that replace the CEO may
do so because the person is unable to organize the
company and enable the development of processes
required to grow the firm. In other words,
replacement of the CEO in smaller firms may re-
flect the lack of ability of the CEO to establish
action control.Drivers of the emergence of MCS––venture
capital
A final variable that has been found relevant in
the entrepreneurship literature to explain the level
of professional management in growing firms is
the presence of professional funding in the com-
pany’s financial structure and, in particular, ven-
ture capital (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). 12 Existing
evidence indicates that venture capitalists are not
simply suppliers of financial resources, but also12 Venture capital is a form of financing where venture
capitalists (financing intermediaries) provide cash to the com-
pany in exchange for a portion of the equity. Given the
uncertainty that characterize young companies (Venkataraman,
1997), venture capital tends to be the only professional long-
term financing that these companies get before they go public
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Therefore, the argument for this
hypothesis is stated around venture capital following the focus
of the entrepreneurship literature and the evidence that this type
of capital is typically the only professional funding that these
companies get. If alternative professional sources of funds are
important, then the research design decision around using
venture capital would decrease the power of the study. An
alternative relevant funding event is the IPO; tests (not
reported) indicate that this event is not significant in the sample
examined.facilitate access to a network of knowledge and
resources (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996;
Robie, Wright, & Chiplin, 1997). Through their
investments, venture capitalists develop a signifi-
cant knowledge about growing firms that they can
share with the firms that they invest in, thus
accelerating their development. If MCS are
important to the success of a growing firm, then
venture capitalists will encourage their develop-
ment in a timely fashion.
The specific demands on information disclosure
that venture capitalists require may also lead to
faster implementation of result control. Venture
capitalists have a financial interest on the firm and
as such they are interested in aligning the moti-
vation of employees with the financial success of
the firm––through financial and non-financial
objectives, which happens through results control.
The effect of venture capitalists on personnel
and action control is uncertain. On the one hand,
venture capitalists may encourage their adoption
because they believe them to be important for the
well functioning of the organization and its suc-
cess. If this is the case, venture capitalists demand
companies that they invest in to have these pro-
fessional tools. On the other hand, personnel and
action controls are further removed from the
governance structure of the organization––in par-
ticular the board of directors where these investors
seat––compared to compensation decisions and
organizational goals’ approval, which are associ-
ated with results control. Unless venture capitalists
spend significant amount of time at the companies,
they may be unable to affect how personnel and
action control systems are structured.
Research design
Research data
The sample for this study contains 95 small,
young, technology-oriented firms in California’s
Silicon Valley. The focus on small, young, high
technology firms allowed the selection of a large
enough homogenous sample within geographical
reach and likely to be transitioning into a stage
where MCS are needed. While a homogenous
sample limits the threat of potential confounding
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tech firms through theoretical generalization (Yin,
1989). 13 The database combines qualitative and
quantitative information on how these firms for-
malized practices to manage human resources
through the development of management control
systems. These systems are not exhaustive of all
systems in an organization. However, systems to
evaluate and reward employees, manage organi-
zational culture, and code certain organizational
processes (within the human resource function)
capture a significant and important part of MCS
in small growing firms. Focusing on a subset of
management control systems allowed triangulating
the data among different respondents knowledge-
able of the human resource management systems.
This research design decision increases the reli-
ability of the data at the expense of reducing the
scope of MCS examined. Thus, the findings only
apply to this subset of MCS and further general-
izations should be made with the appropriate
caveats.
As previously mentioned, the firms included in
the sample are young firms (at most 10 years old
when the project started), but with more than 10
employees (to exclude firms too small to have any
formal processes). The sample includes at most 10
years of information per company even if, given
the periodic updating of the database, additional
information is available for some firms. 14 This
cut-off gives enough observations within each
single year (the minimum being 45 observations in
the 10th year). The initial list of companies was
gathered from three different sources of firms in
the Silicon Valley: Rich’s Everyday Sales Pros-
pecting Guide, Technology Resource Guide to13 The study builds upon a larger research effort initiated in
1994 known as the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies
(SPEC) (Baron et al., 1996, 1999; Burton, 1996; Hellmann &
Puri, 2002). The broad focus of this research project is the
impact of the founders’ model of organizing on the human
resource practices in growing firms including managerial
intensity, employment systems, gender mix, inertia and change,
and turnover.
14 The project went back to the companies on a periodic
basis until 1998. The 10-year period of data for each company
ends between 1994 and 1998 depending on whether the
company was already 10 years old in 1994.Greater Silicon Valley, and Silicon Valley Business
Press. The sampling procedure excluded foreign
firms; it also grouped firms according to size and
then larger firms were over-sampled relative to
smaller firms. This stratified sampling procedure
was intended to capture larger firms where pro-
fessional management tools are more likely to have
been adopted. The data was gathered through
interviews with different managers in each of these
firms including founders, CEOs, and managers
knowledgeable about the human resource practices
of their firm. The interviews were semi-structured
with a clear set of questions to be explored; addi-
tional archival information describing the history
of the firm was gathered when available during
these interviews. Before the interviews were con-
ducted, several key informants were asked to fill
out different surveys. These surveys included
information on the timing of adoption of different
MCS related to human resource management, 15
size of the company, and date for critical events
including founding date, replacement of CEO, and
venture capital funding received. The questionnaire
was reviewed during the interview process to insure
that all the information was appropriately cap-
tured. Interviews were used, among other pur-
poses, to identify the strategy of the firm. The
information on each company was supplemented
with any additional public information available.
Even if the database has various characteristics
that make it unique to the purposes of this paper, it
is subject to the recall and respondent biases
associated with survey and interview data as well as
to a potential survivorship bias, because only
existing firms were sampled.
Table 1 presents the various MCS in the
database that were adopted by at least 25 firms
in the sample. Baron et al. (1996) provide a de-
tailed analysis of the individual evolution of each
of these systems. Merchant’s typology (previ-
ously described) is used to classify the various
systems captured in the questionnaire. Because15 The survey asked respondents to provide the date when a
particular management control system was adopted but not
whether it was subsequently dropped. Interview data indicates
that the latter event was rare. Appendix A reproduces the
questionnaire item capturing management control data.
Table 1
Classification of management control systems by academic scholars







P1 Regular company-wide sponsored social events 11 0 1 3 83
P2 Regular company-wide meetings 9 2 1 3 83
P3 Employee orientation program 15 0 0 0 67
P4 Mission or values statement 12 3 0 0 66
P5 Standard employment application 12 3 0 0 61
P6 In-house training 12 2 0 1 55
P7 Background check on prospective employees 13 0 2 0 47
P8 Human resources information system 8 5 0 2 45
P9 Newsletter or other regular company-wide
correspondence
7 3 1 4 38
P10 Employee suggestion system 7 1 1 6 30
A1 Legal agreements about intellectual property/
non-competition
1 13 0 1 84
A2 Organizational chart 2 11 0 2 81
A3 Standard performance evaluation form 0 9 6 0 79
A4 Personnel manual or handbook 4 10 0 1 72
A5 Written job descriptions 1 14 0 0 49
A6 Written affirmative action plans 2 12 0 1 41
R1 Stock options 0 0 15 0 84
R2 Written performance evaluations 0 1 14 0 81
R3 Individual bonuses 0 0 15 0 69
R4 Skilled based pay 3 0 11 1 42
R5 Non-monetary recognition awards 1 0 14 0 39
R6 Team incentives or bonuses 2 0 13 0 32
R7 Profit sharing 1 0 14 0 29
Signing bonus 6 0 2 7 33
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weighted combination of the three types of
control that Merchant identifies, mapping the
systems into the typology involves a certain de-
gree of subjectivity. To address this concern and
map these systems into the typology, the fol-
lowing procedure was used. 16 Fifteen professors16 Alternative procedures like statistical techniques for var-
iable reduction were not used for several reasons. The first is
related to data availability: to run these techniques a significant
sample is required, however most firms did not adopt all the
systems and the available sample was smaller than the number
of variables. Second, the common data among systems are their
adoption dates, thus grouping variables around common
factors would involve using an independent variable to define
the dependent one.knowledgeable about MCS––either through their
research or their teaching––were contacted. Each
one was asked to classify each of the 23 man-
agement control systems in the database into the
type of control that best reflected the control
process of the system (or into the category ‘‘not
a control system’’). The kappa statistic measure
of inter-rater agreement was 0.51 (p < 0:001).
Finally, each system was assigned to the type of
control that received the most votes. Table 1
presents the results.Independent variables
Size (LnSize) is measured as the natural loga-
rithm of the number of employees working at the
232 T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248end of each year. 17 Age (Age) is the time since the
founding of the company; to homogenize the
interpretation of this event, it is defined as the date
in which the company was registered. Venture
capital (VC) is a dummy variable updated yearly
that takes the value of one if the company has
venture capital financing and zero otherwise.
Similarly, NewCeo is a dummy variable also up-
dated every year that takes the value of one if a
new CEO replaced the founder and zero if the
founder is still CEO.
In addition to these variables, the research de-
sign controls for industry. This variable may cap-
ture some of the differences across firms in terms of
their external (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984) or
production environments (Brownell & Merchant,
1990). The broader literature on MCS indicates
that these variables are associated with variation in
the design of these systems across companies. If
the arguments developed to explain variation
among the MCS of larger firms are relevant to the
emergence of MCS––for example, firms with more
structured operations like product assembly may
adopt MCS sooner because these tasks are more
amenable to explicit coding compared to less
structured operations like product development,
then controlling for them may enhance the power
of the research design. Five industries are coded
using dummy variables: telecommunications,
medical devices, manufacturing, semiconductors,
and computer (reference industry in the empirical
tests).
In addition, a dummy is included to capture the
strategy of the firm. Business strategy has been
identified as relevant to explain cross-sectional
variation in the design of management control
systems (Kober et al., 2000; Langfield-Smith,
1997). The relevance of strategy to the success of
small firms has also been empirically documented
(Feeser & Willard, 1990). To code this variable,
the founder and the CEO were asked to describe
the distinctive competence of the firm. Their17 The logarithm is used to capture potential non-linearity
associated with large values of this variable.descriptions were content-analyzed by two differ-
ent researchers and coded into five different strat-
egies: superior marketing (reference industry in the
empirical tests), technology leadership (innova-
tion), enhance existing technology, cost minimi-
zation, and technology-market hybrid. The
strategy variables are coded as dummy variables.Results
The second section presented different argu-
ments that may affect the emergence of MCS. This
section empirically examines these arguments.
Two different multivariate methods are used:
regression and structural equation modeling.
Given the exploratory nature of the study, a
regression specification puts very little structure on
the model and directly tests the impact of the
variables of interest after controlling for industry
and strategy. The structural equation model puts
more structure on the underlying relationships
and, as such, it requires a more established theory
and a larger number of observations. However, the
entrepreneurship literature offers enough guidance
to relate certain explanatory variables into a more
elaborate model and thus more informative than
the regression specification. Together, both anal-
yses provide robust evidence about the arguments
developed in the second section. The regression
specification better fits the exploratory nature of
the study. The structural equation model, with
stronger assumptions about the underlying struc-
ture of the relationships, gives a more informative
analysis.Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the
sample. All of the variables increase over time. Size
increases over time, as expected in growing firms.
Also the number of firms that received venture
funding, as well as those where the founder was
replaced as CEO, grows over time. Finally, the
adoption of the three types of MCS also increases
over time. Panel B provides the distribution of
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
MCS
Mean 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.60
Std. dev. 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21
Personnel control
Mean 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.59
Std. dev. 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26
Action control
Mean 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.72
Std. dev. 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.24
Results control
Mean 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.53
Std. dev. 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
Size
Mean 28.77 40.56 58.48 79.30 115.61 134.37 148.30 200.63 298.85 300.19
Median 11 20 29 42 63 70 86 120 126 190
Std. dev. 65.06 87.86 130.26 175.45 238.39 215.53 220.77 258.65 585.65 445.89
Venture capital
Mean 0.42 0.56 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.78
Founder
Mean 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.52
Panel B: Industry and strategy
Industry Number of companies Strategy Number of companies
Semiconductors 10 Technology leadership 49
Telecommunications 21 Enhance current technology 17
Medical devices 16 Market leadership 13
Manufacturing 5 Hybrid market-technology 11
Computer 43 Cost leadership 5
Panel C: Correlation matrix








NewCeo 0.25 0.28 0.46
MCS 0.49 0.47 0.27 0.26
Personnel control 0.41 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.93
Action control 0.50 0.45 0.27 0.24 0.86 0.72
Result control 0.38 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.82 0.64 0.58
Panel A: Personnel, action, and results control are the percentage of systems adopted over the maximum number of systems that can be potentially adopted. Size is the number of employees.
Venture capital (dummy variable that takes value of one if the company received venture funding and zero otherwise) reflects the percentage of firms having venture capital in their equity.
Founder (dummy variable that takes value of one if the founder was replaced as CEO and zero otherwise) reflects the percentage of firms having replaced their founder as CEO.
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Fig. 1. Adoption of management control systems: Panel A––
Management control systems and organizational age; Panel
B––Management control systems and organizational size. The
size portfolios are distributed to have the same number of
observations and include the following sizes: <17.5, (17.5, 34),
(34,75), (75, 160), >160.
18 A comparison of the mean percentage of systems adopted
(for each type of system) confirmed that the differences are all
significant (at the 5%) except between sizes (17.5, 34) and
(34,75).
19 The tables report eb, thus a coefficient of 1 is equivalent to
b ¼ 0 indicating that the incremental effect of the corresponding
independent variable on the probability of adopting manage-
ment control systems is zero.
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puter firms account for close to 50% of the sample.
Given that the industry distribution, it is not sur-
prising that close to 50% of the companies in the
sample follow a technology leadership strategy.
Panel C presents the correlation of the company-
year observations.
Fig. 1 elaborates on the previous table and
presents the growth of the three types of MCS
identified in this research. Panel A plots the
growth in the number of systems adopted (as
percentage of the total number of systems) against
the age of the company; panel B plots growth
against five portfolios of company sizes. Both
panels show a positive relationship and no dis-
cernible differences across types of systems. Inter-
estingly, panel B suggests three stages in the
emergence of MCS as a function of size; compa-
nies start adopting these systems for organiza-tional sizes below 17 people, and keep on adding
systems until they reach 34 people. However no
new systems seem to be necessary until size reaches
75 people, when additional systems are adopted. 18
A ‘‘natural’’ slow-down emerges between sizes 34
and 75 indicating that above size 75 (approxi-
mately), the coordination and control needs are
not fulfilled anymore with the systems developed
during the early stages.Multivariate results––regression specification
To examine the arguments presented in second
section, the number of systems adopted at the end
of each year per company in total and within each
of Merchant’s types of controls is counted. A
Poisson model better captures the discrete nature
of count data (dependent variable) compared to a
traditional ordinary least square model (Greene,
2000). The probability of observing a certain
number of management control systems adopted
at a point in time is











where y ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; . . . is the number of systems
adopted, xj are the explanatory variables, and bj
are the coefficients for the explanatory variables. A
coefficient equal to one indicates that the inde-
pendent variable has no effect upon the probability
of adopting MCS. 19 A coefficient larger (smaller)
than one indicates that the independent variable
increases (decreases) the probability of adopting
MCS. The explanatory variables include size, age,
whether the founder had been replaced as CEO,
and the presence of venture capital as well as the
T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248 235control variables. All variables are updated every
year. 20 Table 3 reports the results.
Size has a positive and significant impact at the
overall MCS level and at the level of personnel,
action, and results controls. The significance of size
in action control suggests that internal controls are
also adopted as the firm grows or that alternative
action control systems dominate the empirical
relationship. Similarly, the coefficient for age is
positive and significant in every specification: older
companies are more likely to have adopted a larger
number of MCS after controlling for the other
explanatory variables. This is consistent with the
various types of systems benefiting from learning
effects and against personnel and result controls
being adopted as needs unrelated to time arise. The
replacement of the founder by a new CEO (New-
Ceo¼ 1) also has a significant positive effect except
for action control. This evidence indicates that
while entrepreneurs allow the development of ac-
tion control, they fail to put in place personnel and
results controls until a new CEO brings them to the
firm. Similarly, venture capital funding (VC¼ 1) is
also significant for all specifications consistent with
venture capitalists influencing all aspects of control20 To check the robustness of the results, alternative spec-
ifications are examined. First, separate Poisson regressions for
each of the 10 years are examined; the significance of the
coefficients is tested using a Z-statistic that corrects for cross-
sectional and serial correlation (Z is defined as z=ðstdevðzÞ=ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðN  1Þ
p
Þ where N is the number of regressions performed; the
z-statistic is asymptotically normally distributed and Z tests the
significance of its mean). Because age is kept constant in each of
the regressions, this specification tests the significance of
variables other than age. The conclusions from this specifica-
tion were identical to the ones from Table 3. Next, the sample is
partitioned based on size. Each observation is classified into one
of five equal portfolios of increasing size (the five portfolios
were the same ones as in Fig. 1: size <17.5, 17.5 < size < 34,
34 < size < 75, 75 < size < 160, size > 160). When a company
has more than one observation in a portfolio (for example its
size in different years fell within the same portfolio), observa-
tions are averaged. A separate Poisson regression is run for
each size portfolio. This specification tests the significance of
variables other than size (in particular, age). The results were
also consistent with Table 3 except for personnel control
systems, where age was not significant. To further test the
significance of the results, a survival model to explain the time-
to-adoption of 50% of the MCS was examined. Results were
also comparable.systems’ adoption. Industry and strategy are jointly
significant. 21
The second section also argued that the impact
of age on the emergence of MCS may stronger for
larger firms. To test this argument controlling for
the results in Table 3, a new variable is defined as
the interaction between the standardized size and
age variables. This interaction term captures the
effect of age at different size levels. Table 4 presents
the results.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction
term is negative for all specifications. This result
suggests that for a given size, older firms are less
likely to have adopted more management control
systems. To further investigate this result and po-
tential non-linearities in the relationship, each
firm-year is classified into the five portfolios de-
fined in Fig. 1. The interaction term is replaced
with four interaction terms, where a dummy vari-
able for each of the four largest portfolios is
interacted with age. The results (included in
Appendix B) indicate that the negative effect of
size on age weakly holds for the four largest
portfolios and only when considering all MCS
together. Moreover, the coefficients on the inter-
action terms are not significantly different from
each other for the most part. Thus, it appears that
the effect of size on age is not due to a particular
size portfolio of firms.
The second section also developed the argument
of a differential effect of the replacement of the
founder as CEO across companies with different21 Companies classified as manufacturing are more likely to
develop MCS sooner (although this conclusion should be read
with care as the sample only includes five firms in this industry).
The nature of the manufacturing process may itself lead to
more rapid formalization compared to the other industries in
the sample that appear to be more R and D oriented.
Companies following an innovation strategy and hybrid strat-
egy take longer than the reference strategy (market leadership),
probably reflecting an effort to safeguard the creativity that has
typically been associated with informal management. Surpris-
ingly, companies following a cost strategy take longer to adapt
action control; given the importance of controlling costs, a fast
adoption of action control to code and monitor cost reduction
learning would be expected. (Again, only five companies follow
a cost strategy and this conclusion should be read considering
this caveat.)
Table 3
The emergence of management control systems
LnSize VC NewCeo Age Industry Strategy
Semi-cond. Telecom. Medical Manuf. Innovate Enhance Hybrid Cost
MCS
Coefficient 1.03 1.38 1.11 1.10 0.91 0.94 0.87 1.49 0.78 0.84 0.77 0.86
Z-stat 1.76 3.81 2.13 9.22 )0.72 )0.55 )1.09 4.90 )2.36 )1.30 )2.73 )1.54
Personnel control
Coefficient 1.03 1.41 1.11 1.10 1.05 0.93 0.89 1.73 0.78 0.91 0.74 0.83
Z-stat 1.32 2.94 1.71 7.36 0.29 )0.54 )0.70 4.49 )1.60 )0.53 )1.87 )1.25
Action control
Coefficient 1.04 1.47 1.07 1.12 0.73 0.94 0.90 1.47 0.78 0.71 0.79 0.73
Z-stat 2.00 4.38 1.16 8.59 )2.17 )0.60 )0.89 3.51 )2.69 )2.67 )2.69 )3.29
Results control
Coefficient 1.03 1.26 1.15 1.08 0.85 0.96 0.80 1.27 0.81 0.90 0.82 1.02
Z-stat 1.73 2.78 2.29 8.84 )0.94 )0.33 )1.55 1.25 )1.79 )0.76 )1.40 0.13
The table reports the Poisson regression for the pooled data controlling for potential autocorrelation of error terms for observations from the same firm. The coefficients
reported are the incidence rate ratio (eb). , ,  indicate significant at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively; one-tailed for LnSize, VC, NewCeo, Age, two-tailed otherwise. The
















































The impact of age at different size levels on the emergence of management control systems
MCS Personnel control Action control Results control
Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat
LnSize 1.11 3.59 1.12 3.08 1.13 4.01 1.07 1.99
VC 1.32 3.37 1.30 2.47 1.38 3.61 1.30 2.88
NewCeo 1.17 2.80 1.20 2.44 1.09 1.29 1.21 2.89
Age 1.08 7.20 1.08 5.49 1.11 8.32 1.06 4.51
Age * Lnsize 0.89 )3.59 0.90 )2.58 0.86 )4.17 0.91 )2.39
Industry
Semicond. 0.87 )1.30 1.01 0.11 0.67 )3.31 0.89 )0.94
Telecom. 0.94 )0.84 0.87 )1.45 0.93 )0.91 1.04 0.52
Medical 0.81 )2.65 0.86 )1.47 0.84 )1.99 0.72 )3.88
Manufact. 1.75 4.55 2.11 5.30 1.69 3.60 1.38 1.92
Strategy
Innovation 0.88 )1.46 0.86 )1.33 0.88 )1.45 0.90 )1.09
Enhance 0.93 )0.66 1.02 0.12 0.82 )1.81 0.94 )0.56
Hybrid 0.96 )0.43 0.96 )0.31 0.99 )0.14 0.93 )0.63
Cost 0.68 )2.35 0.64 )2.27 0.52 )3.28 0.92 )0.46
The table reports the Poisson regression for the pooled data, controlling for potential autocorrelation of error terms for observations
from the same firm. The coefficients reported are the incidence rate ratio (eb). , ,  indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively; one-tailed for LnSize, VC, NewCeo, Age, and Age * LnSize, two-tailed otherwise. The reference strategy is market
leadership and the reference industry is computer. Chow test indicates that industry and strategy variables are jointly significant
(p < 0:01) in all regressions.
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results in Table 3, I define a new variable as the
interaction between the founder’s variable and
the size variable. Table 5 reports the results.
The results indicate that the effect of replacing
the founder as CEO on the emergence of MCS is
significantly larger for smaller firms. Interestingly,
the effect holds for all three types of systems,
including action control. This is in contrast with
the non-significant effect of replacing the founder
on action control in Table 3 and suggests that in
smaller firms, the replacement of the CEO may be
related to the inability of this person to put in
place action control. 2222 As an alternative specification, firms that replaced their
founder were classified into five groups, following the five size
portfolios identified in Fig. 1. Each group was defined as the
size of the firm when the CEO is replaced. This variable was
interacted with NewCeo to identify the effect of replacing the
CEO for companies of different size. The results indicate that
the impact of replacing the founder was more significant for the
smallest group of firms.Multivariate results––structural equation model
This sub-section examines the data impos-
ing more structure into the model rather than
assuming that the hypothesized explanatory vari-
ables are fully exogenous. Using a structural
equation model, the specification examines the
potential endogeneity among explanatory vari-
ables as the entrepreneurial literature outlines. Fig.
2 describes the model.
The model reflects the relationships captured in
Table 3 between management control systems and
size (b1), age (b2), replacement of founder (b3),
and venture capital (b4). It also includes the
moderating effect of age on size (c1) (Table 4) and
replacement of founder (c2) (Table 5). In addition,
it includes the potential relationship between age
and size (a1), where older firms are expected to be
larger, the potential relationship between size and
obtaining venture capital (a2)––larger firms are
more likely to have venture capital (Sapienza et al.,
1996), the potential effect of age on the replace-
ment of the founder as CEO (a3) and the argument
that venture capitalists professionalize firms and,
Table 5
The impact of replacing the founder as CEO at different growth rates on the emergence of management control systems
MCS Personnel control Action control Results control
Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat
LnSize 1.06 2.89 1.06 2.21 1.08 2.75 1.07 2.72
Age 1.10 9.25 1.10 7.44 1.12 8.60 1.08 8.66
VC 1.34 3.76 1.37 2.90 1.43 4.15 1.22 2.62
NewCeo 1.48 2.56 1.42 1.91 1.46 2.17 1.58 3.11
NewCeo * Lnsize 0.93 )2.29 0.94 )1.60 0.93 )2.08 0.93 )2.65
Industry
Semicond. 0.91 )0.68 1.06 0.30 0.74 )2.25 0.85 )0.89
Telecom. 0.94 )0.63 0.92 )0.57 0.94 )0.64 0.94 )0.49
Medical 0.86 )1.19 0.88 )0.77 0.89 )0.97 0.78 )1.65
Manufact. 1.50 5.05 1.73 4.67 1.49 3.77 1.29 1.30
Strategy
Innovation 0.80 )2.22 0.79 )1.53 0.79 )2.45 0.84 )1.53
Enhance 0.87 )1.08 0.92 )0.43 0.74 )2.38 0.95 )0.40
Hybrid 0.77 )2.80 0.74 )1.93 0.78 )2.69 0.83 )1.29
Cost 0.87 )1.50 0.83 )1.30 0.74 )3.55 1.04 0.20
The table reports the Poisson regression for the pooled data, controlling for potential autocorrelation of error terms for observations
from the same firm. The coefficients reported are the incidence rate ratio (eb). , ,  indicate significant at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively;
one-tailed for Age, VC, LnSize, NewCEO and NewCEO * LnSize. The reference strategy is market leadership and the reference
industry is computer. Chow test indicates that industry and strategy variables are jointly significant (p < 0:01) in all regressions.
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(a4) (Robie et al., 1997). This alternative model is
estimated using a structural equation model with
linear equations including an intercept term and
using the covariance matrix. Because the empirical
variables are the theoretical variables of the study,
the measurement model does not include an error
term, but the linear equations’ model does.
This estimation procedure relies on a more
restrictive set of distributional assumptions than
the regression specification; moreover, the num-
ber of observations available is somewhat low to
estimate the full model. 23 Thus, these tests
should be interpreted with these caveats in
mind. However, by placing a more elaborate
model, it allows to examine the relevance of the
results after controlling for potentially relevant
interactions. Table 6 reports the results. In23 The suggested number of observations is between 100 and
200 (Kline, 1998) and at least 200 if the model includes more
than 10 variables. In order to maximize the degrees of freedom,
the model does not include the controls for industry and
strategy.contrast to the regression specification, the
coefficients here are interpreted as having a po-
sitive effect if above zero and a negative effect if
below zero.
Panel A reports the results comparable to
Table 3 and Panel B reports the results com-
parable to Table 4. Goodness of fit statistics
indicates adequate fit of the models. In both
Panels, the results are comparable to those re-
ported in Tables 3 and 4 except for the signifi-
cance of new CEO’s coefficient on the action
control model, which was absent in Table 3. Its
significance questions the previous conclusion
and suggests that entrepreneurs may also delay
the adoption of these systems. The coefficient
for VC in the personnel control specification in
Panel A is insignificant, in contrast to Table 3.
This result is consistent with these investors not
affecting the development of this type of control.
The interaction in Panel B between age and size
is not significant for personnel control suggest-
ing that the argument on the effect of age on
size may not hold for these systems. Finally,
























Fig. 2. Path diagram of the estimation model including potential endogenous relationships.
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and that the moderating effect of size upon age
may not capture this potential relationship
adequately.
Including the moderating effect of size on the
replacement of the founder to the models in Panels
A and B was not significant; this is in contrast with
results in Table 5. One potential explanation for
this latter result is that the effect of age and VC
upon the replacement of CEO and the correlation
between age and size (a1) and size and VC (a2)
captures this moderating effect.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the
four explanatory variables having a significant
effect on the adoption on management control
systems. The effect of venture capital upon per-
sonnel control and the replacement of the founder
upon action control are the only variables where
the conclusions are not robust across specifica-
tions.
The significance of the endogenous relation-
ships highlights their relevance to the phenome-
non. Thus, the structural equation model givesevidence relevant not only to the emergence of
MCS but also to the entrepreneurial process.
Moreover, the fact that the coefficients on the
exploratory variables are significant after control-
ling for the relationship among these variables
indicate that the effects are not driven by poten-
tially omitted relationships as it might have been
the case in the less developed model underlying the
regression specification.
Extensions
The previous specifications do not allow for the
exploration of potential interrelations among the
different types of MCS that Merchant’s typology
identifies. Moreover, theory does not yet offer
arguments to guide predictions. However, empiri-
cal examination of these relationships is relevant
to understanding whether different control systems
are implemented together, for example, personnel
and results controls reinforce each other; whether
they are substitutes for each other, for example,
the adoption of personnel control makes results
Table 6
The emergence of management control systems including endogenous relationships among explanatory variables
MCS Personnel control Action control Results control
Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat
Panel A: Direct effects
LnSize (b1) 0.919
 5.58 0.479 5.56 0.243 4.57 0.197 3.58
Age (b2) 0.705
 8.86 0.280 6.75 0.261 10.16 0.164 6.17
NewCEO (b3) 1.137
 2.89 0.517 2.51 0.227 1.78 0.393 2.98
VC (b4) 0.940
 2.19 0.293 1.31 0.328 2.40 0.319 2.23
a1 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69
a2 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15
a3 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53
a4 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03
RMSEA 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
AGFI 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Hoetler’s critical
N
779 779 779 779
Panel B: Age-size moderating effects
LnSize (b1) 0.866
 5.27 0.465 5.41 0.230 4.33 0.172 3.14
Age (b2) 0.711
 8.96 0.282 6.78 0.262 10.23 0.167 6.31
NewCEO (b3) 1.197
 3.05 0.533 2.59 0.242 1.91 0.422 3.22
VC (b4) 0.872
 2.04 0.275 1.23 0.310 2.23 0.287 2.01
LnSize * Age (c1) )0.423 )2.33 )0.112 )1.18 )0.107 )1.82 )0.204 )3.36
a1 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69 0.286 18.69
a2 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15 0.136 12.15
a3 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53 0.034 5.53
a4 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03 0.255 7.03
RMSEA 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
AGFI 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Hoetler’s critical
N
263 263 263 263
The table presents the unstandardized path coefficients. , ,  indicate significant at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
24 The time-to-adoption of the first system is the time since
the birth of the company (age).
240 T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248control redundant; or whether they are indepen-
dent, for example, personnel and results controls
address unrelated control issues.
To provide some preliminary evidence on
whether the three types of control systems behave
as complements, supplements, or are independent
of each other, the following tests explore how the
density of systems already adopted affects the time
it takes to implement an additional control system.
For each type of management control system
(personnel, action, and results) and for each
company, the systems are ordered from the earliest
one adopted to the latest. The time-to-adoption is
the time between the adoption of two consecutive
systems. For example, if a personnel control sys-
tems was implemented at the end of year three,and the following one is implemented at the end of
year four, the time-to-adoption of the latter system
is defined to be 1 year. 24 If the control systems
that a company has already implemented behave
as supplements (complements), then the time-to-
adoption will be longer (shorter). For example, if
action and result controls are supplements, then
the time-to-adoption of a new action control is
expected to be longer the more result control sys-
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Fig. 3. Time between adoption of successive management
control systems.
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The density of existing MCS is measured using
three variables (one for each type of control sys-
tem): Numper is the number of personnel control
systems already implemented, Numact is the
number of action control systems already imple-
mented, and Numres is the number of result con-
trol systems already implemented.
The time-to-adoption for each individual sys-
tem is treated as an observation; standard errors
are adjusted for heterogeneity. An event history
analysis approach is used to examine this ques-
tion. This research design is appropriate to
investigate the time to an event––for example, the
adoption of a management control system––and
identifies which explanatory variables are rele-
vant to this time-to-adoption. A survival model




Pr½ðt6 T < t þ D jT P tÞ=D

ðKiefer; 1988Þ:
hðtÞ can be interpreted as the conditional
probability of adopting a system in the interval
(t; t þ D), given that it has not been reached at time
t. 25 Several characterizations of hðtÞ have been
suggested (Lee, 1992). The simplest form is an
exponential function that has constant hazard
rate, and independent variables affect the slope of
the hazard rate: hðtÞ ¼ expðbi  xiÞ, where the b’s
are the coefficients and x’s are the independent
variables. In this case, it is also hypothesized that
the age of the firm may affect the hazard rate and
thus use a model that explicitly incorporates the
effect of time: hðtÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ expðbi  xiÞ. A Weibull
specification is used to control for a time-varying
hazard rate: hðtÞ ¼ p  tp1  expðbi  xiÞ, where p is
a parameter estimated within the model. Finally,
some of the dependent variables (size, presence of
venture capital, replacement of founder, and
density of MCS) are time dependent, thus the25 This interpretation is only approximate because the
definition includes a D in the denominator.estimated model is: hðt; xiðtÞÞ ¼ p  tp1  expðbi
xiðtÞÞ.
Fig. 3 reports the average time-to-adoption for
the sequence of management control systems
within each category––personnel, action, and re-
sults. The first action control takes the longest to
become formalized (1.9 years compared to 0.7 for
personnel and 1.1 for results). Otherwise, the pat-
tern is not clear-cut but suggests that the time-to-
adoption decreases initially and then increases.
Table 7 presents the results of the multivariate
analysis. The coefficient for Numper for the per-
sonnel control model is less than one. This result
indicates that the more personnel control systems
are already implemented, the longer the time-to-
adoption of a new personnel control system. In
other words, personnel control systems behave as
supplements of each other; the value of an addi-
tional personnel control system decreases with the
number of personnel systems already adopted.
Also, the number of action and results control
systems has no significant impact on the adoption
of personnel control systems. For the action con-
trol model, Numper has a coefficient larger than
one. This finding suggests that the existence of
personnel control decreases the time-to-adoption
of action control; thus action and personnel con-
trols complement each other. Thus, the value of
action control seems to increase the more personnel
control systems are present. Numact and Numres
are both significant and less than one, indicat-
ing that their presence delays the time-to-adoption
Table 7
Time-to-adoption of sequential management systems
Personnel control Action control Results control
Hazard ratio z-Statistic Hazard ratio z-Statistic Hazard ratio z-Statistic
LnSize 1.00 )0.06 1.04 0.74 0.90 )1.47
VC 1.11 0.80 1.31 2.02 1.40 2.08
NewCeo 0.99 )0.04 1.12 2.00 0.84 )1.08
Numper 0.91 )2.05 1.12 2.74 1.05 1.04
Numact 0.96 )0.75 0.76 )4.21 0.92 )1.24
Numres 1.04 0.80 0.88 )2.33 0.79 )3.68
Industry
Semicond. 0.92 )0.42 0.65 )1.63 0.83 )0.74
Telecom. 0.86 )0.96 1.19 1.05 0.94 )0.33
Medical 0.91 )0.50 0.95 )0.29 0.83 )1.00
Manufact. 0.80 )0.87 1.14 0.37 0.94 )0.16
Strategy
Innovation 0.94 )0.36 0.88 )0.65 0.81 )0.97
Enhance 0.90 )0.53 0.68 )1.50 1.02 0.07
Hybrid 1.23 0.89 1.03 0.14 0.89 )0.44
Cost 0.50 1.51 0.63 )1.25 0.78 )0.63
Parameter p 0.65 )10.77 0.76 )6.03 0.75 )5.30
The model estimates time-to-adoption between consecutive personnel, action, and results control systems. For the first system, the
time-to-adoption is time since founding. The hazard function follows a Weibull specification: hðtÞ ¼ p  tp1  expðbi  xiÞ. LnSize is the
natural logarithm of size, VC is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the company received venture capital funds, NewCEO is a
dummy variable that takes value of one if the founder is not CEO anymore, Numper is the number of personnel control systems in
place at the time the new system is adopted, Numact is the number of action control systems in place at the time the new system is
adopted, Numres is the number of results control systems in place at the time the new system is adopted. Significance tests are one-
tailed for LnSize, VC, and NewCeo, two-tailed otherwise. , , , indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%.
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venture capital, as well as the hiring of a new CEO,
decreases the time-to-adoption of action control
systems. This suggests that these investors, who get
involved closely with the management of the firm,
and new CEOs hired to move the company for-
ward, view action control as useful to managing the
organization. Finally, for the results control model,
Numres is less than one, reinforcing the idea that
the existence of systems with similar characteristics
increases the time-to-adoption of systems within
the same type. In this last model the coefficient for26 A further analysis of the data (not reported) indicates that
the presence of venture capital drives the significance of results
control (Numres) in the action control model. An interaction
term combining VC and Numres was included to the action
control specification and was less than one and significant (VC
remained significant and Numres became insignificant). This
finding suggests that the presence of venture capital drives the
influence of results control on the adoption of action control.VC is significant and larger than one, indicating
that the presence of venture capital reduces the
time to adoption of results control. Finally, the
effect of time (parameter p) also negatively affects
the adoption of new systems; in other words, the
longer the time since the last system was adopted,
the less likely is that the company will adopt a new
system.
These results indicate that the presence of
management systems classified within the same
type have a negative impact on the time-to-adop-
tion. Otherwise, only action control is affected by
the adoption of other types of controls; in partic-
ular the presence of personnel control reduces the
time-to-adoption while results control increase it.
A final set of descriptive statistics examines
which MCS are adopted earlier. For each com-
pany, each system is ranked from the first system
adopted (1), second (2), and so forth. On average,
results control systems have the lowest rank (mean
of 6.65) and this mean is significantly smaller than
Table 8
Ranking of management control systems’ adoption
Management control system Mean
ranking
R1 Stock options 3.72
A1 Legal agreements about intellectual
property/non-competition
3.89
R4 Skilled based pay 4.00
P1 Regular company-wide sponsored social
events
4.54
P2 Regular company-wide meetings 5.31
P7 Background check on prospective
employees
6.52
R2 Written performance evaluations 6.99
A3 Standard performance evaluation form 7.19
P3 Employee orientation program 7.24
P5 Standard employment application 7.44
R7 Profit sharing 8.07
R3 Individual bonuses 8.09
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tion control (mean of 7.73). 27 This finding sug-
gests that result control tends to be adopted earlier
than the other types of control. Table 8 provides
the mean rank for the 23 MCS considered in this
research.
The systems adopted first include: stock op-
tions, legal agreements about intellectual property/
non-competition, skill-based pay and regular
company-wide sponsored social events. Pair-wise
comparison of means for these four systems is not
significant; however, Wilcoxon pair-wise rank tests
indicate a significant difference between ‘‘stock
options’’ and ‘‘regular company-wide sponsored
social events.’’ Interestingly, these four systems
include personnel, action, and results controls.R5 Non-monetary recognition awards 8.18
A2 Organizational chart 8.19
P4 Mission or values statement 8.26
P6 In-house training 8.38
P8 Human resources information system 9.27
A4 Personnel manual or handbook 9.38
A6 Written affirmative action plans 9.76
A5 Written job descriptions 10.20
R6 Team incentives or bonuses 10.63
P10 Employee suggestion system 10.67
P9 Newsletter or other regular company-
wide correspondence
11.92
The table reports the mean rank for each MCS. A pair-wise
difference in means larger than 1.30 (1.70) is significant at the
10% (5%) level.Discussion and conclusions
Understanding the emergence of formal MCS is
important to managing growing firms (Moores &
Yuen, 2001). An informal approach to the coor-
dination and control of organizational activities
becomes harder (and costlier) as the organization
grows and formalizing these management activities
becomes vital for future growth. The paper iden-
tifies an empirical association consistent with the
predictions advanced in the theoretical literature.
In the early stages of the growth of an organiza-
tion, size is consistently presented as a key driver
of the emergence of control systems. Consistent
with this prediction, the results provide evidence
on the relevance of size as an explanatory variable.
An interesting and unexplained pattern is the
association between the percentage of MCS
adopted and size. This percentage increases for
firms up to a size of 34 people, then it flattens and
only starts increasing again when the size of the
organization reaches around 75 people.
The evidence is also consistent with age being a
relevant variable in explaining the emergence of27 The mean rank for personnel and action controls is not
significantly different.MCS. Age is argued to be relevant through its
impact on the variation, selection, and retention
processes where the experimentation and learning
of an organization is codified over time into formal
management systems.
The findings are also consistent with arguments
suggesting that the replacement of the original
founder by a new CEO has a positive impact on
the emergence of MCS. Further analysis indicates
that this effect is only significant for smaller firms.
In other words, the replacement of the founder is
linked to the emergence of MCS only for compa-
nies that are more likely to need these systems.
Founders in these companies may not be able to
manage the transition into a more structured
organization and a new CEO needs to be brought
in to manage the transition.
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presence of venture capital; this result suggests
that these investors may transfer their manage-
ment experience to the companies they invest in,
and perceive the early adoption of management
control systems as useful to the growth of the firm.
Finally, industry––potentially proxying for envi-
ronment or production process––and strategy are
relevant to the phenomenon.
Interestingly, the pattern of behavior across
personnel, action, and results control systems is
very similar. All the explanatory variables
affect the adoption of these systems except for
the effect of the replacement of the founder on
action control’s adoption and venture capital
upon personnel control. Such consistency sug-
gests that similar forces affect the adoption of all
management control systems. However, the re-
search design did not allow discriminating
among these different forces––for instance, the
relevance of learning versus the relevance of
complexity.
This study provides preliminary evidence on the
emergence of management control systems, and
future research can fruitfully expand these results.
First, the study is limited to management control
systems to manage human resources and high
technology firms; it is not informative about the
evolution in non-tech firms, or in other parts of the
company, in particular at the top management
level. A follow-up study could take a broader
perspective and investigate the emergence of MCS
to fulfill the planning and monitoring needs of the
company or, more broadly, their role in the for-
mulation and implementation of strategy. Plan-
ning in these companies has proven to be relevant
to pace their evolution (Gersick, 1994), but both
theory and empirical evidence are scant on this
issue. Furthermore, the study focuses on particular
systems; an alternative approach that has been
previously used in the literature (Chenhall &
Morris, 1986) is to abstract from particular sys-
tems and focus on the characteristics of these
systems. For example, Moores and Yuen (2001)
study how the mix of information, the aggregation
and integration of the information, its scope and
its timeliness change across life-cycle stages; butthey do not address what variables drive these
changes.
Second, the study documents the relevance of
size as well as age and suggests why these variables
are relevant; however, it fails to identify how these
variables act in organizations. For example, how
do growing firms identify their need to adopt
MCS? Is it due to process breakdowns? Is it
through managers’ past experience? Do customers
or partners require them? Is it prompted by the
need to prepare for an event like an IPO? It is
possible that more experienced entrepreneurs or
entrepreneurs with large company experience are
more likely to adopt MCS faster. Another alter-
native to develop these systems is to hire a per-
son––such as an HR manager or a CFO––that
knows about them and implements them. Fur-
thermore, external influences, not only venture
capitalists, but also partners or customers may
affect the emergence of MCS. Also the particular
circumstances of the organization may require
earlier adoption of these systems––for instance,
organizations facing cash constraints or evolving
business models may rely on structured systems
that facilitate the processing of information.
The study also fails to identify where the
knowledge to design MCS comes from. Does it
come from managers’ experience? From the board
of directors? Or from trial and error? These ques-
tions are important to advancing our knowledge,
and the current study is silent about them.
Extending the current study to non-technology
firms also adds to the research agenda. Field study
research could be used to answer these questions
and potentially build a new theory that concep-
tualizes the process of MCS emergence.
Third, as companies grow, the theory indi-
cates that organizational structure becomes a key
variable to explain the emergence of new man-
agement control systems. Existing literature has
looked mostly at the role of organizational
structure in cross-sectional models but not from a
longitudinal perspective. Finally, the study ig-
nores performance––a traditional variable in
contingency research. Including this variable can
be informative in evaluating whether formaliza-
tion of the coordination and control processes is
T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248 245appropriate and, if so, at which stage is it most
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Appendix A. Management control systems’
questions
IV. Documents and procedures
Listed below are various types of human re-
sources documents, practices and systems which
an organization might have. For each item that
your organization currently has, please indicate
when it was created and the last time it was sig-
nificantly modified. (Check the ‘‘Not Applicable’’













246 T. Davila / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 223–248Appendix B. Testing for the interaction between ageMCS Personnel control Action control Results control
Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat
LnSize 1.17 3.41 1.19 2.65 1.19 3.37 1.14 2.34
VC 1.39 3.62 1.38 2.64 1.48 3.86 1.35 3.17
NewCeo 1.17 2.69 1.19 2.34 1.08 1.21 1.21 2.86
Age 1.13 2.81 1.16 1.97 1.14 2.93 1.08 1.78
Age * size2 0.99 )0.25 0.95 )0.76 1.02 0.51 1.02 0.48
Age * size3 0.96 )0.99 0.93 )0.96 0.97 )0.71 0.99 )0.29
Age * size4 0.94 )1.29 0.92 )1.06 0.96 )1.04 0.97 )0.70
Age * size5 0.93 )1.41 0.91 )1.12 0.95 )1.13 0.95 )0.89
Industry
Semicond. 0.88 )1.16 1.03 0.20 0.66 )3.12 0.91 )0.82
Telecom. 0.94 )0.72 0.87 )1.26 0.93 )0.82 1.05 0.64
Medical 0.82 )2.49 0.87 )1.35 0.84 )1.97 0.73 )3.75
Manufact. 1.78 5.01 2.19 6.03 1.74 4.04 1.36 1.84
Strategy
Innovation 0.85 )1.74 0.84 )1.47 0.85 )1.86 0.87 )1.43
Enhance 0.91 )0.85 1.00 0.02 0.79 )2.09 0.92 )0.76
Hybrid 0.92 )0.86 0.93 )0.58 0.93 )0.80 0.90 )0.96
Cost 0.69 )2.28 0.65 )2.28 0.53 )3.58 0.95 )0.28and size for different firm sizesThe table reports the Poisson regression for the
pooled data, controlling for potential autocorrela-
tion of error terms for observations from the same
firm. The coefficients reported are the incidence rate
ratio (eb). Size1 takes value of one if the company
belonged to the smallest portfolio in Fig. 1 when the
CEO was replaced, size2 if the company belonged
to the second portfolio, size3 if the company be-
longed to the third portfolio, size4 if the company
belonged to the fourth portfolio, and size5 if the
company belonged to the largest portfolio. , , 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively; one-tailed for LnSize, VC, NewCeo,
Age, and interaction terms, two-tailed otherwise.
The reference strategy is market leadership and the
reference industry is computer. Chow test indicates
that industry and strategy variables are jointly sig-
nificant (p < 0:01) in all regressions.References
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